

# The Contemporary Significance of Marx's Concept of Liberty

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## 1. Introduction

This paper is a study of the meaning of human freedom or liberty (I shall use both words interchangeably) in Marx's early thought. It examines his concept of man, his interpretation of the relation between man and state, and his proposed blue print for a new society. The works used in my analysis are limited to those which were written by 1848. This is because Marx struggled for the social conditions that would produce the free man for about forty years after the publication of his "Communist Manifesto", without turning to ask what the 'realm of freedom' might mean because of the intensity of that struggle. After 1844, Marx's primary interest did not lie in the nature of freedom, but in the developments by which freedom would come into existence.

The reason why I take up this theme is that the development of the Soviet Union has created new interpretations of Marx. The Soviet radicalism of the early 1920's was soon abandoned. Especially after the late 1930's, the Soviet's (at least official) propaganda began to put an emphasis on the importance of patriotism, strict obedience to the 'will of the community', and general respect for the norms of Soviet morality. It was Isaiah Berlin who attempted to formulate the two concepts of liberty and advocate the notion of 'negative' freedom against the notion of 'positive' freedom which, in his opinion, led to an interfering act with others. He appears to see its theoretical form in Marx's thought and its practical form in Soviet society ever since the Russian Revolution.

This raises a question as to whether the notion of 'positive' freedom should be considered as a source

of authoritarianism as Berlin asserted. What is the idea of 'positive' freedom, and what are its functions in modern society? Before coming to Marx, I first deal with the relation between liberty and authority which is expressed in "Contrat Social" of Jean Jacques Rousseau, partly because he is sometimes said to be a forerunner of modern collectivistic thought<sup>1)</sup> and partly because of the fact that we can see in him the culmination of the tension between liberty and nationalism or, in Rousseau's word, patriotism. I hope I will be able to make it clear what significance Marx's concept of liberty has.

## 2. Two Concepts of Liberty<sup>2)</sup>

In his inaugural lecture delivered before Oxford University in 1958, Isaiah Berlin classified various political senses of liberty into two categories: the first one of them is "involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he wants to do or be, without interference by other persons?'" ; the second one in the question "What, or who is the source of control or interference, that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?"<sup>3)</sup> According to Berlin, the incompatibility between these two concepts of liberty is the origin of "the great clash of ideologies that dominates our world".<sup>4)</sup>

Generally speaking, we feel ourselves free to the extent others do not interfere with our wishes or activities. Political liberty, therefore, lies in the area in which we can do whatever we want. It follows that "the wider the area of non-interference the wider the freedom".<sup>5)</sup> It goes without saying that this ind-

individualistic notion of freedom, which Berlin named 'negative' freedom, is characteristic of the modern British and French worlds of thought,<sup>6)</sup> that is to say, this is what we understand under the name of liberty 'from'. We find an eloquent spokesman of this kind of liberalism in John Stuart Mill. Mill was proud of declaring that "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way..."<sup>7)</sup>, most highly respecting "individual vigor and manifold diversity"<sup>8)</sup> without which society is to be withered up by contemptuous "collective mediocrity."<sup>9)</sup> It would be unnecessary to multiply examples any more. Suffice it to say that "the worth of a state", to Mill's mind, "in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it"<sup>10)</sup> and that this traditional Western way of thinking leads us to what Lassalle called a nightwatchman-state.

'Positive' freedom comes from how one can be his own master or how one can be an active doer who is self-oriented and not directed by other men. This notion, in the end, might lead us to the identification of ourselves with reason, with 'higher nature' or with true selves,<sup>11)</sup> when we believe that we act on or along with what we consider eternal morality, the law of nature or logic, or an inherent law of the development of our society. "The real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual, as a social 'whole' ...: a tribe, a race ... a state, the great society, a class, a nation".<sup>12)</sup> This entity might impose its single collective will on its members and allow them to "justify the coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a 'higher' level of freedom"<sup>13)</sup> because they are too blind to know what they themselves are and what their true needs and goals are, and thus they may be coerced in the name of their 'real' selves or on their own behalf. For Berlin, once this entity becomes an impersonal or superpersonal one it will be the transcendent and dominant self, which will overcome the empirical self's various desires and passions to be disciplined by a social whole. He says that "Enough manipulation with the definitions of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes",<sup>14)</sup> concluding that "the 'negative' liberty... seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery by classes or peoples,

or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it recognizes the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another".<sup>15)</sup>

Here it is clear that Berlin has in mind the birth and development of the totalitarian powers in the first half of the twentieth century. His inaugural lecture was delivered just two years after the Russian military overran Hungary in 1956, only one decade after the threat of the Nazism was eliminated. This reminds us that being incapable of forgetting the Jacobin dictatorship, Benjamin Constant ardently endeavored to protect human (individual) privacy in which man can do what he wants. Berlin seems to follow this French predecessor in asserting the importance of 'negative' freedom, which has a long tradition in England ever since the Magna Carta. On the one hand, I am ready to approve of its importance in the modern state which exercises an enormous influence upon society. On the other hand, however, I have reservations about Berlin's attitude towards 'positive' freedom. Is it certain that the actual conditions in today's Soviet society are the result of faithful practice of Marx's lessons? If so, Berlin's argument would be convincing. But today's Soviet society seems to be far from a possible society proposed by Marx, above all, in the context of human freedom. This is the reason why I want to rive the concepts of man and liberty in Marxist thought itself.

### 3. Liberty in the political philosophy Jean Jacques Rousseau

Saint-Just, a fiery patriot called 'an angel of terrorism' as a right hand man of Robespierre (a disciple of Rousseau), once said that patriotism entailed something fearful which was so exclusive that it required man to sacrifice everything on behalf of public advantage..., it was always something fearful that produced good for a whole. Admitting that he was an unfavorable pupil of Rousseau, Rousseau himself certainly maintained that man had become man only through a coercive authority of the state, that is to say, man to be man must be under the rational authority of his fellow men.<sup>16)</sup>

As well known, the 'General Will' is the fundamental concept of Rousseau's philosophy of the state. According to him, the 'General Will' is always right,

it can not err. If so, then what is to be done if a difference comes up between the 'General Will' and the particular interests of individuals? Carl Schmitt unequivocally tells us that this difference "is dealt with through a simple alternative—whether something individual agrees with something general and thus has a value or the former does not agree with the latter and thus is even null, nothing, bad, corrupt..."<sup>17)</sup>

Here we are on the threshold of justifying the coercion of those who are against the 'General Will'; that is, the will of a nation. "Man should, once he is corrupt (due to becoming a slave of the individual will), be brought again into a manlike condition through the state..."<sup>18)</sup> and "the practical answer was the annihilation of unfree people. The justification lies in the proposition, which Rousseau himself expressed, that if circumstances require it may be necessary to compel man to be free".<sup>19)</sup>

Rousseau's nationalism, which substituted the 'General Will' as a new god for traditional God, implied man's subordination to a universal and absolute will beyond individual wills. A nation would be a new church. Just as it was preached that man should find a community of love in Christendom, so it was now declared that modern man could see happy community life in nationalism as a new doctrine. Rousseau correctly described the secret of nation-building, saying that "Whoso would undertake to give institutions to a People must work with full consciousness that he has set himself to change, as it were, the very stuff of human nature; to transform each individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole, into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in a sense, he derives his life and his being..."<sup>20)</sup>

However, it would surely be gibberish to say that Rousseau did not pay much attention to human freedom. Men originally make a social contract so that they can be free. The Social Contract is thought to be a solution to the question of how to form a society which protects, with all the common power, the person and goods of each member and in which each, when united with his fellows, obeys his own will and remains as free as he was before. To Rousseau liberty does not mean to be subject to appetite, but to obey the laws laid down by the society of

which a man is a member,<sup>21)</sup> that is, the laws which he has prescribed to himself.

By authority Rousseau means the 'General will' which is based upon a certain homogeneity and unanimity, in other words, a certain agreement on some general principles of life in society. Without them a political society would disappear. It follows, therefore, that when a man is punished by society he punishes himself, and he obeys his own will. We can not say that he is not free because he is coerced by himself. As A.J. Carlyle puts it, "the authority of a political society is not, in the end, a mechanical thing, but the expression of a living unity".<sup>22)</sup> And he finds a convincing example of it in the historical fact that the English have recognized that the 'General Will' of the Irish is different from their own.

It is Rousseau that sets out "the principle that freedom... (means) a rational subordination of the individual to the rational authority of a coercive society, in and through which alone he is a man; but this authority is limited by the principles of life which are common to himself and the other members of the society".<sup>23)</sup> In my opinion, what Rousseau had in mind when he spoke of the 'General Will' was not any absolute will which was alien to individual members of society or independent from them. It was nothing other than common or general principles shared by individual constituents of a homogeneous society.

#### 4. Man and Liberty in the political thought of Karl Marx

Freedom, man's feeling of self-respect, is to be awakened again in the heart of these men. Only this feeling, which disappeared from the world together with the Greeks and disappeared into the blue mists of Heaven together with Christianity, can once more make from a society a human community for their highest purposes, a democratic state.<sup>24)</sup>

As Karl Marx wrote this letter to A. Ruge in 1843, he chose communism for the sake of human freedom, not for the sake of social security. For him security is nothing but the assurance of egoism, which is a symbol of bourgeois society. "The state of affairs in Germany" seemed to be "beneath the level of history"<sup>25)</sup> so that Marx sought to free himself and his intellectual fellows from the pressure exercised upon

them by the mediocre and oppressive Prussian police state. It was the longing for freedom that was his essential mode of feeling, a red thread running through all his life.

### (1) Society and the State in the Bourgeois Democracy

Young Marx thinks of man's freedom and self-determined activity as the essentially human characteristic that distinguishes man from the beast. But the actual human conditions under the bourgeois democracy are far from Marx's image of truly human society. The bourgeois revolutions brought about both the consummation of the idealism of the state and of the materialism of civil society, which means 'the schism between the political state—the sphere of man as a species-being in association with other men—and civil society—the sphere of human egoism, bellum omnium contra omnes—', or 'the division of man into the public person—a citizen—and the private person—a member of civil society'.<sup>26)</sup> A citizen man participates in the universal life of the state, but this participation remains in the margin of his private life as a private person, because the man who is engaged in work or commerce in civil society is still trapped in his own particularity. This dualism leads to man's nonfulfillment of his self-realization.

...could civil society separate itself completely from the life of the state, sever all the species-bonds of man, establish egoism and selfish need in their place, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomic, antagonistic individuals.<sup>27)</sup>

A specific activity and situation in a man's life have nothing but individual significance any more. They are not considered as the universal relation of an individual to the state as a whole.

If so, then what kind of rights does an individual enjoy? Marx finds two categories: the first one is political rights which only a member of a community can exercise. They are "participation in the community life, in the political life of the community, the life of the state"<sup>28)</sup>, i.e., political liberty (the rights of a citizen). The second one is the rights of man, the rights of a member of civil society, or the rights of egoistic man separated from his fellows and from the community.

What is liberty of a private person like? Marx finds in human liberty in the bourgeois democracy the same principle which operates in economic life of civil society:

The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.<sup>29)</sup>

Here is a clear-cut description of the attribute of bourgeois liberty. This is the notion of individualistic liberty which was advocated by Mill and B. Constant, i.e., liberty of each separate man, holding all his rights, menaced by collectivistic institutions like the state. Liberty as rights of man, thus, does not depend upon the unity of man and man, but upon the atomic separation of man from man.

When this liberty is applied to practical life, civil society will be full of individuals, each with his little empire of rights of self-interest.

The practical application of the right of liberty is the right of private property... the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as one will; without regard for other men and independently of society ... this individual liberty, and its application, form the basis of civil society.<sup>30)</sup>

What will fill or bridge the gap between one member of society and another, the gap coming from the right of separation? It should be a sort of cement uniting many tiles of various colors. Marx dramatically gave his answer to this question, citing Goethe and Shakespeare.<sup>31)</sup> In his opinion, it is money that binds individuals together. Money is the bond of all bonds as well as the universal measure of all things. Marx asserted that civil society was the world of wealth and that money was the magic which changed inhabitants of that world into slaves. For the same reason Judaism seemed to Marx the worship of the visible divinity, money.

...the sphere in which man functions as a species-being is degraded to a level below the sphere where he functions as a partial being, and finally...it is man as a bourgeois and not man as a citizen who is considered the true and authentic man.<sup>32)</sup>

These conditions of man were what the bourgeois democracy produced. In other words, here were the

limits of political emancipation and the political state at the same time, because the latter which had been brought about by the former was only an abstract structure that had its basis on egoistic men in civil society. Both of them rested on civil society. But Marx suggested that the universality of political life was injured by the egoism of economic and atomic man in civil society. It follows, therefore, that what the world needed was not a political revolution which did not change the social structure, but a social and economic revolution beyond religion and politics. That is what Marx meant by human emancipation at the end of the first part of his essay "On the Jewish Question": the unification of the real man and the abstract citizen, or the unification of an individual man and a species-being in his daily life and Work. Now Marx proceeds to an examination of economic life in civil society.

## (2) The Concept of Alienation

According to Marx, the riddle of private property which is the essence of bourgeois society is solved by asking questions about alienation, because the secret of private property lies in the fact that it is both the product of alienated labour on the one hand and the means by which labour alienates itself on the other. Hegel had already argued in his "Phenomenology" that human mind has such two experiences as the projection of itself into objects and the alienation that follows when mind treats its own externalizations as independent of itself and even as hostile objects confronting it.<sup>33)</sup> Feuerbach had applied the concept of alienation to religion, saying that man projects his own powers into the blue mists of heaven and then worships them as the powers of an foreign, absolute being.<sup>34)</sup>

But alienation, for Marx, is the fundamental fact of political economy, of which the fundamental category is man's actual activities. That must be his starting point. He points out that the worker sinks to the level of the most miserable commodity; the miserableness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production; the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands; thus the entire society inevitably breaks apart into the two classes—the property owners and the propertyless workers.<sup>35)</sup>

To put these economic facts in other words, the more the worker produces, the less he earns and en-

joys, and, the more the capitalist competes, the more he is ruined. Here Marx comes to the concept of alienation:

...labour's product (the objectification of labour) ...confronts labour as something alien, as a power independent of the producer (the worker)<sup>36)</sup>

Here is the first form of alienation—the alienation of the worker's product from the worker: the alienation of the thing. This explains the second one—the alienation of the worker's act of production from the worker: the self-alienation, because labour does not belong to worker's essential being, but to someone else's, and because in labour the worker belongs, not to himself, but to another.<sup>37)</sup>

Marx, next, finds the third form of alienation. It is the alienation of the species from man, in which his social existence becomes a mere means for satisfying his individual needs instead of representing his essential nature. (I shall deal with Marx's concept of man in the next section.)

These arguments lead us to the final form of alienation:

An immediate consequence of the fact that man is alienated (1) from the product of his labour, (2) from his life-activity, (3) from his species-being, is the alienation of man from man.<sup>38)</sup>

Marx goes on to ask to whom both the product of the worker and his act of production or life-activity belong. Now the answer is that:

...(they) belong to some other man than the worker...he begets the dominion of the one who does not produce over production and over the product... he confers to the stranger activity which is not his own.<sup>39)</sup>

Marx arrives at the secret of private property here. Yes, private property is nothing but the sour fruit, or, the necessary consequence of alienated labour. This is the unmistakable actuality of economic life in civil society which forms the very basis of the political state. He regards the human self-alienation expressed in private property as the essence of civil society, trying to explain its necessary contradictions in terms of that concept.

The alienation and these resultant contradictions can be abolished only by one radical class declaring:<sup>40)</sup>

that I am nothing and I should be everything, as if it were the 'fourth estate' in modern history. But that class must be something new in history because it is created only when their inner indignation against the bourgeoisie and their class-consciousness are added to poverty. Marx, in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", proudly found this class in the proletariat, which is a total loss of humanity due to the alienation.<sup>41)</sup> It is the proletariat which accomplishes human emancipation by going along the platform expressed in "Manifesto of the Communist Party". But it is not my aim in this paper to examine any revolutionary tactics. We are, therefore, in a position to proceed to a possible socialistic association which will take the place of bourgeois society.

### (3) Man, society and state in Marx

Feuerbach had seen man as a species-being (not existence but essence). The essence of man is what constitutes in him his species, that is, Reason, Will, and Heart.<sup>42)</sup> These are conceived of as within in an individual and having a species-character beyond him at the same time.

But Marx regards a species-being (not essence but existence) as a thing which includes not only an inner human quality (as in Feuerbach) but also an outer human activity, because he is concerned with the human self-alienation within real life-activity, while Feuerbach is concerned with it within consciousness. This is expressed in "On the Jewish Question":

Human emancipation will only be complete... when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being ...<sup>43)</sup>

We know here that the essence of man is grasped through his social activity. Man produces everything for society as a social being, because society would have him act for others just as it would have others act for him.<sup>44)</sup> In "Private Property and Communism" we hear more than once Marx saying that man's individual and species lives are not different:

Man, much as he may... be a particular individual..., is just as much the totality... of thought and experienced society...<sup>45)</sup>

Let us attempt to put this context in the "I-You" formula—then, one may say, "If you use or enjoy

my product, - I can supply your demand with an appropriate object through the medium of my labour and I am now glad to know that for you I am a medium between you and the species." Thus, it is clear now that the output of one's own life in labour has a social relationship which means the co-operation of several individuals.<sup>46)</sup>

What Marx had in mind when he spoke of man was the notion of mankind as a whole or of man as a creature inseparable from society. If so, then what kind of life does such a man live in co-operation with others? Each individual under the division of labour in bourgeois society is engaged in a particular, exclusive activity. However, Marx gives a detailed description of daily life in communist society in "German Ideology":

...society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow ...<sup>47)</sup>

This explanation reminds us of the notion of a whole man in the Greek city state. It was a spirit of amateurism, not of professionalism. An ancient Greek was a farmer, a judge, and an athlete in peace, and a soldier and a commander in war. He was requested to vote and make a speech in the citizen assembly because the city state allowed no man to be indifferent to its interests.

Everyday life of the communist man is a similar one. He is involved so deeply in political life as well as economic and social life that the division of man into the public person and the private person disappears. Social life and citizenship, civil society and the state, become one and the same thing. There exists no state in the usual meaning. What exists is a truly human association which is dependent upon and run by spontaneously co-operative men.

As we have seen, the image of civil society was this: because civil society is unpolitical society, "it is dispersed into atomic units, and collected to perform only a single and temporary act, and kept together for a moment and no longer".<sup>48)</sup>

Here we can grasp the real significance of the communist revolution, i.e., the revolution of human consciousness. The aim of communism must be to bring about a complete transformation of human nature, a change of the self, and the creation of a new man. It is in this context that Marx cites Rous-

seau in "On the Jewish Question" (on page 7 of this paper). According to Marx:

Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution...<sup>49)</sup>

This communist consciousness — the consciousness of the necessity of the fundamental revolution — comes only from a class which is destined to bear all the burdens of society, cast out from society, and in antagonism to the bourgeoisie.

We are now in a position to go on to the concept of human freedom or liberty in Marx. It seems to me that the communist man passes through two stages of freedom. The first one will be experienced on the way to communism, the second one in true communist society. Let us begin with the first.

Freedom, for Marx, lies in struggle, i.e., in conscious, co-operative struggle against the bourgeoisie. He would think that the desire for security under the protection of authority would be a base and contemptible desire. It is struggle for abolishing the state which is compared to a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. In such a struggle its participants should be fully aware of who is the true enemy confronting them, how miserable are the conditions they are put in, how they can overcome those conditions, what they are to do in order to restore their humanity, etc. In one word, they should know the causes of their revolt against their real enemy, or they should have class-consciousness. How can they be aware of these things, then? It is possible only through associating as participants in the struggle. This is easily understood from Marx's concept of man mentioned above. Without such an organization, they could not develop an effective movement against the bourgeoisie. Combined action must displace separate action by individuals. But it requires some organization, which, in turn, means some degree of authority. This raises a question as to the relation between freedom and authority.

This stage of the struggle is the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, according to Marx, is only needed during the early stage of socialism. But the proletariat has to take possession of the

state in order to abolish it. Marx admits this:

...every class which is struggling for mastery... as is the case with the proletariat... must first conquer for itself political power... ...the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy,... must constitute itself the nation...<sup>50)</sup>

Here again, the relation of freedom and political power presents itself. Marx would untie this Gordian knot by saying that though a socialist society must be regulated in its early stage, this regulation is based upon spontaneous agreement among the proletariat on their end and means, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat also constitutes a part of human freedom, because it is part of the process of human liberation. If there are any people who are too blind to see their own end and means, they may be coerced to be free. This coercion must be justified on the ground that Marx's freedom is not individualistic freedom, but freedom of man as a species-being, and that his freedom is nothing but the liberation of mankind. Once the proletariat understands that

Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible... in the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association,<sup>51)</sup>

they will never fail to come to unanimity. We remember seeing the like argument in Rousseau.

Next, let us see the second and final stage of freedom of the communist man. It will be clear when the riddle of history is solved, or, when true communism comes into existence.

Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, or human self-alienation...; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social being.<sup>52)</sup>

Under such conditions man really restores the human essence, considered above, and there is no discrepancy between man and society, because there appears an association or a combination of individuals which puts the conditions of the free development of individuals under its control. This association displaces the state, and public power loses its political character. It is

under these conditions that 'the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all', because liberty is possible only when all men are equal...Man enjoys fulfilling the potentialities in him. This must be an eventual image of liberty in Marx.

But we should keep in mind that what Marx means by the above mentioned association is one in which men themselves participate in free and co-operative social activities. In my opinion, here is the secret of communism.

Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established,... We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.<sup>59)</sup>

Our attention is paid to the word 'movement'. The real dynamism of communism seems to lie in a long struggle fighting for a complete transformation of human nature. Just as communism itself is not a static state of things to be desired, but a dynamic movement, so a man striving for or living under communism is not a passive creature, but an active subject who himself seeks to create a new system of human society by working with others. He is not an isolated monad withdrawn into himself. This must be the most outstanding feature of the communist man.

### 5. Conclusion

While Berlin's negative freedom means a state of being left free, his positive freedom means an act of actively working with others on that which one has faith in. The latter does not necessarily exclude interference with others. Furthermore, when this interference is said to be based on any universal principle, it will be regarded as a road to freedom. If we approve of a publicly acknowledged law of social development, its violator may be coerced to act according to that law, because it means his real freedom.

One could see such an example of positive freedom in Rousseau's 'coercion to freedom', Hegel's 'insight into necessity' or Marx's 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'. It is true that they have, more or less, a collectivist view of man in common.

As we have seen, there is tension between political power and human freedom in both Rousseau and Marx. It is as old a matter as the first political entity of human beings, and yet ever new. According to Marx, "The human essence is no abstraction inhe-

ent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."<sup>54)</sup> To put it in other words, man is understood as a real or concrete social being who deeply gets involved economically, socially and politically in common life with others. This nature is never lost, wherever man lives—when he is in antagonism to the bourgeoisie, when he is in the process of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and also when he is in true communist society. Man thinks and acts in an association, which, in turn, lets him appropriate his essence as a species-being. It is in this association, not in the political state with public power, that he is able to develop his potentialities in all directions, that is, enjoy liberty in the strict sense of the word. Here there is no discrepancy between human freedom and social necessity.

Marx's man always lives in co-operation with others, working actively with others. For him, human freedom does not in the least mean a state of being passively left alone. He finds his freedom in active participation in social activity which never fails to let him come into contact with others.

We thus see a model of positive freedom.

On the other hand, let us see such countries as England, America and Japan which adopt a motto of liberal democracy. There is an argument that negative freedom cultivates heterogeneity among men, while positive freedom extinguishes it in so far as it may be linked with homogeneity inherent in modern mass democracy. Here we should remember the general contradiction between freedom and power. If negative freedom must be preserved at all, it must first be protected from political power. But history tells us that a paper Bill of Rights was not an effective stronghold for protecting negative freedom before the totalitarian powers in the twentieth century.

If we admit that positive freedom is public freedom and that political liberty is part of public freedom, then to deny positive freedom might lead to the renunciation of political liberty. We learn from history, however, that we need political liberty even to protect private freedom. That is to say, even to protect negative freedom, we need active political participation or free political activity: positive freedom.

Furthermore, democracy originally entails some degree of political participation. Political participation, in so far as it is done freely, must be in the exercise



of positive freedom. In short, positive freedom is inherent in democracy.

Here seems to be the contemporary significance of Marx's concepts of man and liberty, regardless of political ideologies. Without the man who works with his community and his fellow men through an active participation in social and political activity, democracy is destined to wither sooner or later. The intensifying phenomenon that people withdraw to their private lives without paying much attention to public life leads me to listen to Marx's voice.

#### Notes

- 1) For example, J.L. Talmon in his *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1952)
- 2) For further information about the historical background of these two concepts of liberty, see Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Pap., 1959), pp. 350-357.
- 3) Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (London: Oxford Univ. press, 1958), p. 7.
- 4) *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 6) See, de Ruggiero, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-350.
- 7) J.S. Mill, "On Liberty", in *The Utilitarians* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 487.
- 8) *Ibid.*, p. 533.
- 9) *Ibid.*, p. 542.
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 597.
- 11) Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- 12) *Ibid.*, p. p. 17, 19.
- 13) *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 14) *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 15) *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- 16) See, J.J. Rousseau, "The Social Contract", in *Social Contract*, ed. Earnest Barker (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), p. 185.
- 17) Carl Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (München: Dunker und Humboolt, 1921), S. 120. These English translations (notes 17, 18 and 19) from German are mine. I am responsible for possible errors.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p. 122. The parenthetical words are mine.
- 19) *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- 20) Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
- 21) *Ibid.*, p. 186.
- 22) A. J. Carlyle, *Political Liberty* (London: Frank Cass, 1963), p. 186.
- 23) *Ibid.*, p. 187.
- 24) Karl Marx, "Briefe aus den 'Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbüchern'", in *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels Werke*, Band 1, ss. 338-339. The English translation from German is mine. I am responsible for possible errors.
- 25) Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction". in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 13.
- 26) Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 27) *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- 29) Karl Marx, "Communisto Manifesto", *The Marx-Engels Reader*, *op. cit.*, p. 351.
- 30) Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- 31) Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844". *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- 32) Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question" *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 33) See, Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", *Ibid.*, pp 86-103.
- 34) Cf., Zwar Hanfi, *The Fiery Erock* (New York: Doubleday., 1972), p. 127.
- 35) Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", *op. cit.*, p. 56.
- 36) *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- 37) *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- 38) *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 39) *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
- 40) Karl and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. C.J. Arthur (New York: Int'l Publishers, 1974), p. 56.
- 41) Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 42) Zwar Hanfi, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
- 43) Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", *op. cit.*, p. 44.
- 44) Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, ed. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), p. 118.
- 45) Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 46) Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

- 47) *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- 48) Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, op. cit., p. 112.
- 49) Karl Marx, "The German Ideology", in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, op. cit., p. 157.
- 50) Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, ed. C.J. Arthur, op. cit., p. 54; "Communist Manifesto", op. cit., p. 350.
- 51) Karl Marx, "The German Ideology", in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, op. cit., p. 161.
- 52) Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", op. cit., p. 70.
- 53) Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
- 54) Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, op. cit., p. 109.